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Background
On April 21, 1960, Brazil moved its capital from Rio 
de Janeiro to Brasília. Rio de Janeiro had been the capital 
of Brazil since 1572 and served as the capital of Portugal 
from 1808 to 1821. In 1891, Brazil’s first republican consti-
tution was drafted and contained a clause stating that the 
capital should be moved away from southeastern Brazil to 
the center of the country. The new capital would be more 
isolated from foreign influence and would economically 
stimulate the interior of the country, reducing the regional 
dominance of the old capital Rio de Janeiro and other 
southeastern cities such as São Paulo, Niterói, Porto Alegre, 
and Curitiba. President Juscelino Kubitschek de Oliveira 
took on the task to build Brasília, which was completed in 
41 months under his “fifty years of prosperity in five” plan 
to modernize the country (Hochman 2009). Brasília was 
to be a symbol of change representing Brazil’s movement 
into a new era having transcended problems including 
classism, racism, poverty, inequitable housing, and 
corruption. From the surface, the story of Brasília looks 
to be a success: during its short lifespan it has grown to 
become Brazil’s third largest city, it has the highest Human 
Development Index (HDI) in Brazil ([0.911] Pelinski et 
al. 2014), and it has become the wealthiest city in Brazil 
based on GDP per capita ([$35,689 USD] IGBE 2014). 
However, the building of Brasília did not achieve President 
Kubitsheck’s goals of egalitarianism and instead worsened 
issues plaguing other Brazilian cities. The construction of 
the city relied on an extreme urban bias where a dispropor-
tionate amount of federal revenues went to the building 
and provision of services to the new city at the expense of 
the other Brazilian cities, most notably the old capital, Rio 
de Janeiro. Though Brasília was supposed to be a capital 
of hope, its costly construction amplified many of Brazil’s 
existing problems and led to the collapse of democracy. It 
took Brazil decades to recover from a military dictatorship 
and reestablish democratic government.  
In the post-World War II era from 1945-1964, the 
Brazilian government underwent a growth strategy known 
as import substitution industrialization (ISI). Initially, the 
results were astonishing: Brazil’s GDP averaged 7% annual 
growth rate, industry grew at 9%, and agriculture grew at 
4.5% (Peet, Hartwick 2015. p.78). With these astounding 
rates of growth, President Kubitschek believed it was 
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feasible to build Brasília in the Brazilian Highlands of Luíz 
Crul’s 1892 survey. This approach was shortsighted, as 
Brazilian growth relied on large amounts of foreign capital, 
resulting in foreign debt and rampant inflation. Between 
1962 and 1967, the annual rate of GDP growth dropped to 
4%, and industry dropped to 3.9% (Shei Ue 1997). Brazil’s 
ISI policies caused manufacturing labor shortages which 
resulted in a major rural exodus of an estimated 7 million 
people -- 21% of the rural population -- who eventually 
moved into cities and towns in the early 1950s (Martine 
& McGranahan 2013). This rural exodus continued into 
the 1960s, and those unable to find traditional housing 
settled on the outskirts of the city in informal settlements 
known as favelas. Brasília’s proponents believed they could 
solve the housing crisis by developing a new city that was 
designed with egalitarian principles in mind. This was to 
be achieved with a zoning plan, that prompted residents 
of all classes to live together in integrated neighborhoods 
(Kroll 2008).
The new city was to be geographically neutral and its 
construction was intended to stimulate the economies 
of Brazil’s interior states. At the time, it made sense for 
Brazil’s politicians to fulfill the constitutional promise 
of 1891; however, major inefficiencies began to emerge 
with Brazil’s ISI development strategy, including the lack 
of diverse exports and skyrocketing interest and amorti-
zation payments. Shortly after the founding of Brasília, 
the country felt the effects from the government’s use of 
deficit spending to finance construction of the new capital. 
Brazil lost its economic dynamism and, in 1963, inflation 
increased to 80% per annum (Shei Ue 1997). Brasília was 
completed, but at significant cost to the democratization 
process; playing a contributing role in Brazil’s 1960s 
military overthrow.
The Rural Divide and the Construction of 
Brasília
The building of Brasília was expensive and relied on 
deficit spending to finance the construction of the city. 
According to Eugênio Gudin, the Minister of Finance 
under President Café Filho, a conservative estimate for 
the cost to build Brasília was $1.5 billion USD in 1954 
dollars (Coutinho 2012). President Kubitschek constantly 
defended the high expense of construction, stating that 
the cost to build the city was only a couple dollars to the 
average Brazilian: “the sacrifice of only two Cruzeiros in 
five years, for every Brazilian.” (Vaitsman 1968). The cost 
to build Brasília was not frugal by any measure; it signifi-
cantly exceeded both Gudin and Kubitschek’s estimates. 
Today, nearly 60 years after the construction of Brasília’s 
public archive, officials are unsure about the total cost 
of building the city, claiming they are unknown and 
impossible to calculate (da Costa 2010). It is estimated that 
the real dollars spent on Brasília’s construction have never 
been equaled by another major development, including 
the Songdo International Business District in Incheon, 
South Korea, which is often considered one of the world’s 
most expensive development projects ever, exceeding 
$40 billion USD (Garfield 2018). One avenue of finance 
pursued by the federal government was diverting tax 
revenue from rural areas to finance the growth of Brazil’s 
cities, including Brasília (Green 2012).
In rural areas, a large portion of tax revenues was 
not reinvested, but instead was directed to finance the 
development of urban centres. This is a trend abundant 
in Latin America and other LDCs. The trend is very 
extreme in Brasília and the Brazilian northeast, which 
is pervaded by inequitable extraction from and under 
allocation to rural activity (Lipton 1984, p.142-143). 
This strategy was successful in helping develop Brasília, 
as the Federal District progressed decades ahead of its 
surrounding neighbors in terms of services and quality 
of life. This inequity was intentional on behalf of the 
Brazilian government, which maintained a dual policy 
of central city development and rural resettlement (HUD 
1977). Lack of tax reinvestment in rural areas served as 
an incentive for rural migrants to seek out employment in 
large cities to improve their livelihoods (Bradshaw 1987). 
However, this has not been without its consequences. 
Rural areas in Brazil, and especially those surrounding 
Brasília, lacked basic services such as running water, 
sewage, and electricity. These areas had consistently lower 
human development outcomes including lower rates of 
literacy, education, food security, access to healthcare, and 
sustained poorer health outcomes than those residing in 
the urban core (Armitage et al. 2013).  
Brazil adopted a development strategy called ISI, a 
policy aimed at decreasing the reliance on foreign imports 
by increasing domestic production and the development 
of native industrialized products. Brazil maintained this 
strategy from the 1930s to the end of the 1980s. During 
this time, Brazil devalued its currency in order to boost 
exports and discourage imports, as well as to promote 
the consumption of locally manufactured goods. Brazil 
supported and financed industries that produced goods 
such as refrigerators, consumer appliances, cars, air 
conditioning, materials for ship building, and a variety 
of non-durable goods for domestic consumption. These 
industries were centered in the urban areas of Brazil, 
and government support of these industries did little to 
improve the economic situation of rural inhabitants. In 
many ways, the rural-urban divide was exacerbated by this 
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policy. There was an exodus from the rural periphery to 
the urban core due to the lack of prospects in the region 
(Lipton 2008, p.161). The inflation that plagued Brazil 
as a result of deficit spending under Kubitschek severely 
impacted those who remained in rural areas as simple 
consumer goods became unaffordable. In the 1970s, the 
country was plagued by double-digit annual inflation, 
which turned into triple-digit annual inflation by the 1980s 
and would reach 50% at a monthly rate by 1994 (Ito 1994). 
To illustrate the depth of the urban-rural divide, 
consider that the average cost for a twin mattress in Rio 
de Janeiro was than the per capita income in the primarily 
rural province of Piauí in 1968 (Shoumatoff 1980 p.14). 
ISI played a fundamental role in the long-term economic 
development of Brazil’s urban centers, making it one of 
the world’s largest economies. However, in the process of 
developing the urban core, a course of rural development 
was not pursued. Plans to finance Brasília were unsustain-
able because they extracted from revenues devoted to rural 
areas, and the monetary policy was socially unsustainable 
as it resulted in extreme inflation which disproportion-
ally hurt the urban poor and rural peasants of Brazil. 
As a result, many of these regions did not see social or 
economic development, and lagged far behind their urban 
counterparts. 
Individuals living in rural Brazil had little to no ability 
to engage in collective action movements to address the 
problems facing them. According to Robert Bates in his 
research on former West Africa ISI countries, countries 
have little incentive to negotiate with rural groups unless 
they either produce or procure a scarce or valuable 
resource. This was seen as the primary deterrent for West 
African farmers who saw others in similar positions fail 
when demanding redress for their grievances. As a result, 
the farmers did not collectively contest the policies of 
the urban marketing boards and the urban bias policies 
that disproportionately hurt them (Bates 1981). After the 
completion of the capital’s construction, the situation 
in rural areas declined. Then, from 1964 to 1988, the 
Brazilian government was unresponsive to forms of rural 
protest against land tenure law, local land conflicts, social 
banditry, and messianic movements that emerged. The 
country became responsive when the movements nation-
alized and formed groups such as the Movement of the 
Landless (Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem 
Terra [MST]) (Houtzager 2001). However, this story was 
different in Brazil’s neglected urban peripheries, as local 
groups could mobilize to prompt national change. This is 
seen in the case of São Paulo in the 1980s and 1990s where 
members of the urban periphery collectively retaliated 
and received infrastructure updates and services the city 
had previously failed to provide (Caldeira 1996).
 Prior to the 1990s, the Brazilian government 
pursued large scale agroindustry and monocultures in 
rural areas. This continued the trend from the Portuguese 
empire which focused on the production of sugarcane, 
coffee, and the exploitation of resources, including gold 
and Brazilwood. Much of Brazil’s productive farmland 
was controlled by wealthy oligarchs in large estates known 
as latifundias. In 1964, when the military seized power, 
they attempted to break the oligarchic control of the 
region. They used subsidies and policies such as agricul-
tural marketing boards to set price floors and ceilings on 
commodities (Helfand & Castro de Rezende, 2001). In 
this period, the government encouraged the transition 
of many latifundias to develop monocultures in corn, 
soy, chicken, and other meats for export and domestic 
consumption (Bateman & Brochardt 2013). Addition-
ally, the new government attempted to modernize rural 
areas and address the inequities in rural areas. This was 
seen in establishing the Land statute of 1964, a system 
of rural health provision, and social security (Houtzager 
2001). However, the impacts to the region were minimal 
as the government was limited by the debt that had been 
incurred and the rampant inflation. The majority of rural 
inhabitants remained landless peasants. The government 
outreach did allow for rural networks such as the MST 
to develop into national networks to collectively demand 
change in the 1990s (Houtzager 2001). 
Rural development began to be a priority much later 
in Brazil. This occurred initially from reforms in the late 
1980s and continued into the 1990s, corresponding with 
the introduction of a new currency – the Real – and the 
rise of civil societies to combat inequality (Ito 1994). The 
introduction of the Real currency corresponded to major 
economic restructuring. Nominal tariff rates for the sixteen 
principal industrial sectors fell from an average of 105% 
in the late 1980s to 13% from 1994-97. This included the 
agricultural sector, and the state’s agricultural policy tran-
sitioned from interventionist to a free-market approach 
(Helfand & Castro de Rezende, 2001).
Constitutional reforms in 1988 the Brazilian statu-
torily guaranteed that women could receive land, an 
action that before was difficult or even impossible. The 
reforms allowed for women to receive full pensions and 
land from the National Integration Program (Programa 
de Integração Nacional - PIN). Following economic liber-
alization reforms in the 1990s, peasants had easier access 
to obtain title to land and begin small farming practices. 
Additionally, international groups such as the World 
Bank contributed to rural development with the Brazil 
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Rural Poverty Alleviation Program. This encouraged and 
eventually prompted a decentralization of fiscal policy 
and investment from a federal level down to a state level 
and eventually to a local level. This has allowed for greater 
stakeholder participation and local self-governance in the 
development of Brazil’s rural areas (Kuehnast 2001). 
An additional factoring of rural development and 
addressing the urban-rural divide was the rise of civil 
society groups. Groups such as the movement Citizen 
Action against Hunger, Poverty, and for Life (Ação da 
Cidadania contra a Fome, a Miséria e pela Vida) began 
drives to collect food, clothing, and shelter materials to 
serve low-income populations in the state (Houtzager 
2001). This group and others similar to the movement 
Citizen Action forced the government to take issues of 
food insecurity and underdevelopment in rural areas 
more seriously. 
The Brazilian government took a very active role in 
addressing rural development when President Luiz Inácio 
Lula da Silva was elected in 2003. President Lula was a 
member of a civil society group the Citizenship Institute 
(Instituto Cidadania).  He began a plan to eliminate 
hunger in the country and provide social services to 
rural areas where it was lacking. In his presidency, he 
established the National Council of Food and Nutritional 
Security (Conselho Nacional de Segurança Alimentar e 
Nutricional, Consea), a group tasked with making local 
agricultural policy recommendations. Additionally, the 
Safra Plan of Family Agriculture (Plano Safra da Agricul-
tura Familiar) was established as a policy which provided 
financing, credit, investment, and farm insurance for 
small producers and family farms in order to increase the 
biodiversity of crops, strengthen small-scale farmers, and 
increase local demand for produce (Dagnino, 2004).
This commitment to rural development and 
empowering small-scale farmers is seen in a comparison 
of Brazil’s two major farm ministries. In 2013, the Ministry 
of Agriculture (Ministério da Agricultura, Pecuária e Abas-
tecimento, [MAPA]) had a budget of approximately $4.42 
billion USD, where approximately $100 million went to 
small scale producers. Additionally, in 2013, the Ministry 
of Agrarian Development (Ministério do Desenvolvimento 
Agrário, [MDA]), which was developed in 2000, received 
about $2.28 billion USD to support family farming/
small-scale agricultural producers. Although the MDA is 
about half the size of MAPA, it demonstrates a significant 
commitment toward small-scale producers. Additionally, 
the budget for the ministry has increased over 300% from 
2004 to 2013, while MAPA’s budget has only increased 
25% in the same time period (Bateman & Brochart, 2013). 
Health and education outreach has remained a part of 
the federal government’s rural development plans. The 
government has engaged in vaccination campaigns and 
recognized educational institutions built upon unproduc-
tive agricultural land and has provided support to these 
institutions through the Ministry of Education.
The development of Brasília occurred with a signifi-
cant economic and social costs to rural areas. These areas 
faced disparities in revenue extraction and reinvestment 
with their urban counterparts and did not receive the 
same levels of development and attention until the 1990s 
and 2000s. Despite the significant strides in addressing 
the urban-rural divide, there are still major shortcomings 
that can be addressed to create more robust and socially 
sustainable communities. Government loans for small-
holder producers are very strict, often resulting in the 
loss of land if smallholders fail to pay back the remaining 
balance, while these individuals and families often return 
to landless wage labor. Brazil still lacks in social develop-
ment, with over 32 million people still in poverty and 16 
million from indigence living on less than $35 a month. 
Much of these results from prior inequities: a lack of land, 
education, and healthcare due to decades of neglect by 
the Brazilian government. The majority of these residents 
reside either in rural areas or in the informal settlements 
on the peripheries of Brazil’s major cities. Additionally, 
land rights remain an issue. According to the Pastoral 
Land Commission (CPT), a church-based rural organiza-
tion, land raids have remained an issue in Brazil, which 
have been accompanied by violence and intense political 
conflicts. There has been a trend of land raids where over 3 
million individuals – over 660,000 families – have engaged 
in land invasions in Brazil to secure land from 1988-2004. 
Roughly 440,000 of the families received land from the 
government in this period ending their status as wageless 
laborers, but access to land remains a significant issue in 
Brazil in rural areas (Hildago and Richardson 2017). 
The Development of Brasília and the Corre-
sponding Decline of Rio de Janeiro
The high cost to build Brasília and the economic 
opportunities offered by the new city played a role in both 
the political and economic decline of Rio de Janeiro. Rio 
was hampered by factors that prevented sustainable devel-
opment. The area was geographically constrained by the 
Atlantic Ocean to the east and the Serra da Mantiqueira 
mountains to the west. This led to the highest real estate 
prices in Brazil, which made it difficult for small business 
owners to obtain real estate, leading them to operate in 
informal markets or to forgo business entirely. Additionally, 
Rio de Janerio faced extreme political competition where 
the local economy was manipulated to serve political goals 
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(to increase support for a candidate or party) by matter 
of hiring, firing, or lowering/raising wages and/or the 
production of goods (Montero 2001). Brasília did not have 
the same constraints: real estate was inexpensive, it did not 
have parties with established clientelist political networks, 
and geographically there was space to expand and accom-
modate new migrants. As a result of these attractive factors, 
the development of Brasília led to both a capital drain and 
brain drain from the former capital. Rio’s economy, once 
dynamic, started to lose many of the private and state-
owned enterprises that once held headquarters in the city. 
Brasília took all the federal political power and 
associated federal industries from Rio de Janeiro. This 
occurred because the establishment of a national capital is a 
zero-sum game: when a new capital is built, the old capital 
loses the federal power and industry it once retained. This 
was seen in the development of Washington D.C. in the 
United States, when the political industry, influence, and 
power was taken away from the former capitals of New 
York and Philadelphia. Additionally, Brasília attracted 
industries such as banks, public agencies, finance, infor-
mation technology, pharmaceuticals, telecommunications, 
television, consulting, and legal service firms, many of 
whom migrated from Rio de Janeiro. This was catastrophic 
for Rio de Janeiro, which was losing economic influence 
not only to Brasília but also its southern neighbor and 
rival São Paulo. 
São Paulo, unconstrained by geography, had the space 
to accommodate more industry and more immigrants. 
In Brazil, from 1968 to 1973, the “economic miracle” 
occurred as a result of a greater shift towards exports 
and major government industrial investment. During the 
miracle, Brazil’s GDP was growing at a rate of 10% per 
annum (Pattnayak 1996, P. 95) and São Paulo’s economy 
was growing at a rate of 5% per annum (The Economist 
1998). Industry exploded in São Paulo and it became the 
largest industrial power in Latin America. The growth 
from the miracle was short-lived, as it was financed by 
borrowing. The country had accumulated more debt in 
1974 than it had in the previous 150 years combined. The 
miracle effectively ended in 1979, as Brazil had the largest 
debt in the world at about $92 billion USD. Hyperinflation 
began and a recession ensued (Kilborn 1983). Despite the 
economic crash, São Paulo had supplanted Rio de Janeiro 
as Brazil’s commercial, financial, cultural and industrial 
center in the 1970s, establishing a new power dynamic in 
Brazil’s southern frontier. 
Rio de Janeiro, once the political, economic, and 
cultural capital of Brazil, had lost most of its economic 
clout to the rise of São Paulo and its political influence 
to Brasilia. This resulted in a shift in foreign investment 
in Brazil. In 1995, after processes of economic liberaliza-
tion, Brazil’s FDI was $115.5 billion, and quintupled in a 
period of five years (Aguayo-Tellez et al. 2010, P. 2). Much 
of the FDI that went to Brasília and São Paulo would have 
formerly gone to Rio de Janeiro. São Paulo attracts more 
foreign investment than any other Latin American city, 
with $1.4 billion USD in 2013 and $847.2 million USD in 
Table 1: The decline of Rio de Janeiro as the economic center of Brazil can be seen in developmental 
disparities in relation to São Paulo. This is seen in health outcomes, housing laws, distribution of city 
services, and the revenues collected by the government All monetary values in USD
Source:
U.N. Habitat. “The challenge of slums: global report on human settlements 2003.” London: Earthscan (2004).
U.N. Habitat “Cities and climate change: Global report on human settlements 2011.” London: Earthscan (2011).
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2014 (Ammachchi 2015). São Paulo’s economy is funda-
mental to Brazil as it was home to 63% of Brazil’s multina-
tional corporations in 2016 (Winetrout 2016). If the city 
were its own country, its GDP would rank 42nd among 
all countries, between Chile and Finland (FecomercioSP 
2017). A symbol of Rio’s decline can be seen in the fall of 
the Rio de Janeiro Stock Exchange, which was surpassed 
by São Paulo Stock Exchange in the 1970s. Eventually, in 
2002, the São Paulo stock exchange BOVESPA purchased 
the Rio de Janeiro Stock Exchange. Additionally, Brasília 
was considered a more attractive locale to invest, and in 
2015, it was ranked the second highest city in terms of 
foreign direct investment (FDI) in Latin America behind 
São Paulo and ahead of Mexico City (Ammachchi 2015).
In Brazil, Rio de Janeiro no longer served as a premier 
destination for human capital. Migrants followed the 
wealth and chose to settle in Brasília and São Paulo more 
often than Rio de Janeiro. Additionally, the new capital 
was seen as a place of hope while Rio de Janeiro was 
seen as a place of decline. Unskilled migrants known as 
“candangos” migrated to Brasília in search of a better life, 
as they believed they would not be confined to informal 
housing and they would have the opportunity to be 
instrumental in shaping and developing a positive future 
for Brazil. The migration rate from the rural periphery 
increased as the mechanization of farming became 
standard and the transition to intensive commercial cash 
crop cultivation for export led to more pressure on small 
scale farmers, pushing rural laborers into cities (Saint & 
Goldsmith 1980). This allowed Brasília’s federal district 
to develop a vast employment sector for low skill laborers 
including a large food processing industry and a construc-
tion industry responsible for connecting Brasília with 
other major metropolitan centers through immense public 
works projects. Brasília’s initial migrants were notable, 
as they often had higher education levels than migrants 
settling in other Brazilian cities. Of the migrants coming 
into Brasília, 11% had university degrees and 28% had 
completed high school, and many came from the more 
developed regions of southeastern of Brazil including 
Rio de Janeiro (Shoumatoff 1980). This was contrary 
to migration patterns in most Brazilian cities where 
immigrants primarily came from the poor regions of the 
north or the interior of the country with little education 
and settled in the southeast in search of opportunity (Yap 
1976, p. 233). Internal migration increased from 20% in 
1980 to 40% in 1999, with Brasília boasting the highest 
rates of educated migrants (Aguayo-Tellez et al. 2010, p. 
840). Moreover, Brasília attracted many skilled female 
workers, boasting the highest rates of formal employment 
for women and providing opportunities in the formal 
sector which were often difficult to find in other Brazilian 
cities. (Shoumatoff 1980). 
Rio de Janeiro has attempted to remedy this by creating 
special industrial zones on the outskirts of the city to lease 
the land and allow new manufacturing firms to remain 
competitive in Brazil. However, these practices did not 
stop the exodus of industry from the city; between 1989 
and 1997, 22% of the industrial companies moved to other 
areas of the country (Cesar de Queiroz Ribeiro 2011). 
The exodus of corporations to Brasília and the dispro-
portionate investment into São Paulo during the Brazilian 
Miracle came at the expense of Rio’s development. Addi-
tionally, Rio de Janeiro has never fully recovered from 
this exodus and its hopes for an economic revival have 
continued to decline. The city was once the tourism 
capital of Brazil, and despite hosting the 2014 World Cup 
and 2016 Olympics, the city has seen a steady decline in 
tourists since the 1990s (Kiernan & Jelmayer 2016). In 
2007, newly discovered underwater oil reserves signaled 
a potential revival for Rio, but this is no longer the case 
as oil prices have fallen to near-decade lows and Brazil’s 
state-owned oil company Petrobras has been embroiled in 
corruption allegations and hampered by fiscal misman-
agement (Connors & Kiernan 2017). 
The most insidious aspect of the building of Brasília 
was the neglect showed to the former capital of Rio de 
Janeiro. Brazil was investing large amounts of money 
into the building of Brasília when there was a social crisis 
occurring in Rio de Janeiro. In this period, there was a 
significant rise in the number of favelas being constructed 
on the periphery of the city. Rather than address the 
problem of informal settlements the government chose 
to invest public funds in the building of an ostentatious 
capital. The legacy of this choice still lives in the city today. 
The government neglect of the 1950s and 1960s led to the 
establishment of organized criminal networks that Rio de 
Janeiro is still struggling to contest. In the 1970s, under the 
Carlos Lacerda military regime, a favela removal policy 
was implemented that displaced hundreds of thousands of 
residents. Many were relocated to housing projects such 
as City of God (Cidade de Deus). However, these new 
developments were plagued by the same issues faced in 
the old favelas, including substandard living conditions, 
which led to the development of new favelas (Simpson 
2013, P. 8-9). Rio de Janeiro, also known as “the marvelous 
city,” has become a place of fear and uncertainty for its 
residents. The neglect of Rio’s social crisis of the 1950s 
and 1960s led to a political vacuum in the favelas. These 
favelas often lacked services including healthcare, elec-
tricity, sanitation, education, banking, and social services. 
Criminal syndicates often moved in and filled the void 
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by providing these services and acting as an informal 
subnational authority, sometimes winning the hearts and 
minds of the residents of the favelas in the process. In the 
1980s, these criminal syndicates, known as milícias, had 
their power severely expanded as Brazil became a transit 
country for narcotics trafficking. The biggest drug was 
cocaine, primarily from Colombia’s Cali cartel, which left 
Rio de Janeiro’s port en route to wealthy countries such as 
Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Europe, and the United 
States. The milícias that trafficked narcotics were rewarded 
financially, allowing them to exert greater control in their 
favelas. Politically, they were able to provision more goods 
and services, and militarily, they secured arms, allowing 
them to contest both civil and military police forces. 
There are three primary factions made of smaller gangs in 
Rio’s favelas today that compete for dominance: Terceiro 
Comando, Amigos dos Amigos, and Comando Vermelho, 
all of whom have constantly shifting alliances reminis-
cent to the nations of Orwell’s 1984 (Glenny 2015). The 
rise of milícias with paramilitary capabilities is a major 
problem for Rio, as it harms the legitimacy of the Brazilian 
government. First, the milícias who traffic guns and 
drugs are able to secure the hearts and minds of residents 
more effectively than the government, guaranteeing the 
longevity of the milícias. Second, these groups have the 
ability to effectively contest police forces, furthering the 
perception of the milícias’ power and the belief that the 
police are ineffective among the general public. Third, 
these milícias have embedded networks into both the 
operations of the civil and military police leading to the 
corruption of police forces and making them ineffective 
in dealing with the milícias. Fourth, the milícias influence 
elections through violence, intimidation, and the buying 
of votes through political favors, casting doubt on election 
results (Penglase 2014, P. 54). Lastly, the government’s 
most effective police units, Batalhão de Operações 
Policiais Especiais (BOPE), which target milícias, have 
been accused of extreme violence and numerous human 
rights abuses which are often ignored or sanctioned by the 
government, harming the perception of the government 
to the populace (Huguet, Szabó de Carvalho 2008. P. 
104). The increase in violence in the city is one of the 
motivating factors for the exodus of capital in Brazil. In 
1970, Brazil’s nine largest banks were all headquartered 
in Rio de Janeiro, but by the 1980s, the corporate exodus 
had accelerated as many professionals moved out in fear 
of the rising extortions, kidnappings, and killings (Zaluar 
2007 P. 3-5). By 1991, only five of the largest banks had 
remained (Cesar de Queiroz Ribeiro 2011). 
The favelas have become an increasingly difficult 
prospect to deal with, as they now house 22% of the 
population despite only consisting of 3.7% of the city 
land area (The Economist 2016). As corporate divestment 
continued in Rio de Janeiro, the jobs began to dry up, 
but rural migrants continued to settle in the city. The 
new residents with dim economic prospects were settling 
in informal housing settlements known as favelas. From 
1980 to 1990, when Brazil was experiencing hyperinfla-
tion, the populations of the favelas grew 41% despite Rio’s 
overall growth rate holding at 8% (Paddison & Hutton 
2014, P. 144). In the time leading up to the 2014 World 
Cup and 2016 Olympics, the government began a process 
of pacification, or policing, of the favelas leading to a 
reduction in violence. So far, 38 police pacification units 
have been created, which put over 9,500 officers into the 
favelas. However, this solution is likely not viable in the 
long term, as the murder rate has returned to pre-pacifica-
tion numbers while police murders against civilians have 
increased. In 2020, there are still police pacification units in 
the favelas, although their presence decreased significantly 
in 2016 following austerity measures that forced Rio’s State 
Security department to cut its budget by 30% (Associated 
Press 2016). Additionally, in many of the “pacified” favelas 
where security forces have vacated, there has been a return 
to criminal syndicate control (Richmond 2019).
The legacy of neglect in Rio de Janeiro has been exac-
erbated by fiscal mismanagement in the city and state 
government. The structures built for the 2014 World Cup 
and 2016 Summer Olympiad were expensive and are 
no longer in use. Many are starting to experience decay. 
According to a report by Oxford University’s Saïd Business 
School, the Olympic Games were 51% over budget, costing 
$1.6 billion USD more than what was expected (Flyvbjerg 
et al. 2016, p.19). The most notable example of a conse-
quence of the fiscal mismanagement is the 2017 shutdown 
of Rio’s flagship university — Universidade do Estado do 
Rio de Janeiro (UERJ). UERJ was one of Brazil’s largest and 
most prestigious universities, having the highest ranked 
law and medical schools in Brazil (UERJ 2017), but the 
university was shut down for the 2017-2018 academic year 
due to insufficient funding (Sims 2017). Additionally, in 
2018, the National Museum of Brazil burned down, which 
housed fossils, Graeco-Roman and Egyptian artifacts, and 
“Luzia,” the oldest human skeleton found in the Americas. 
The museum had fire prevention mandates cut due to 
austerity measures and had a diminished response to the 
fire due to the government’s austerity measures ((Watts, 
Phillips, and Jones 2018). Despite the lack of funds, Rio 
de Janeiro Governor Luiz Fernando Pezão established a 
contract for a new multimillion-dollar private jet for the 
governorship (Jornal Nacional 2017). 
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The city is experiencing significant problems, including 
a Zika pandemic plaguing the favelas (Callaway 2016, 
P.18) and major issues associated with water pollution. 
The state of Rio de Janeiro has significant debt resulting 
from large infrastructure projects such as the Olympics 
and World Cup; it owes approximately $29.5 billion USD 
to the Brazilian government, an amount that exceeds the 
200% percent threshold over net revenue allowed under 
Brazil’s Fiscal Responsibility Law (LRF) (Fonseca 2019). 
There have been significant concerns that Rio de Janeiro 
will default on its debt; according to State Secretary for 
the Treasury Luiz Claudio Rodrigues de Carvalho, it 
is unlikely that Rio de Janeiro will be able to pay off its 
debt unless there is a structural change in the economy 
of the state (Mann 2019). The severe debt faced by Rio 
de Janeiro makes it difficult for the government to address 
the problems it faces. As a result of the violence, health 
hazards, lack of funds, and declining opportunities, a large 
number of Rio’s residents want to leave. According to a 
poll conducted by the agency Rio Como Vamos, 56% of 
Rio’s inhabitants wanted to leave the city in 2016, up from 
a figure of 27% in 2011 (The Economist 2016).
The governments of both Brazil and the state of Rio de 
Janeiro need to make a concerted effort to promote social 
development in the favelas. The high rate of violence in the 
favelas is a primary factor in both businesses and residents 
wanting to leave the city. The process of pacification has 
not seen much success, because as soon as the police leave, 
criminal syndicates return. Rio de Janeiro needs to develop 
a program that targets young men between the ages 10 and 
29 to prevent them from going into organized crime. Addi-
tionally, the program will need to target systematic causes 
that allow the criminal networks to have such a wide 
influence in the favelas. In the 1990s, Rio de Janeiro had 
extreme homicide rates (over 100 per 100,000 citizens), so 
a comprehensive security program called Pronasci was put 
in place to build local institutions, increase citizen trust in 
the police, and develop a civil culture to reduce violence. 
This was able to drastically reduce the homicide rate seen 
in Brazil. The program had mixed results but did make an 
impact in reducing the violence and influence of criminal 
syndicates in the favelas. However, the program failed 
primarily due to bureaucratic concerns (Ruediger 2013). 
Still, successful elements of the program have informed the 
design of the United Nations Public Security Programme. 
Financial solvency will allow the governments of Rio de 
Janeiro to maneuver in developing programs to address 
the situation. 
1964: The End of the Democratization 
Experiment
The construction of Brasília in a period of 41 months 
was an unprecedented feat that came at an extreme cost. 
Brazil returned to democracy in 1945 after a period 
of rule by dictator Getúlio Vargas, but the return to 
democracy would be short lived. Brazil, despite facing 
unprecedented growth in the 1950s, showed markers 
of economic decay such as the decline of coffee exports 
(Brazil’s primary commodity) and swift social changes 
occurring in Brazilian cities including the rapid devel-
opment of slums and rapid inflation. However, President 
Kubitschek decided to continue with the capital’s 
construction. Kubitschek’s “Fifty years’ progress in five” 
slogan was reworded by his critics as “Fifty years’ inflation 
in five” (Green 2012). The government’s financing plan 
relied on borrowing and manipulating the monetary 
policy by inflating the money supply. The shortcomings 
of the financing plan were widely apparent, as noted by 
New Yorker columnist Tad Szulc in 1957 who stated, “the 
Government is spending more money in its headlong rush 
to build the capital in four years than Brazil’s inflation 
and deficit-ridden economy can afford.” In 1959, Brazil 
was in significant trouble. Inflation was rapidly increasing 
and the overall cost of living in Brazil was rising. Brazil 
asked for assistance from the United States to balance a 
deficit of over $300 million. The United States would only 
oblige if Brazil engaged in economic restructuring and 
would participate in the development of a stabilization 
program with the IMF. However, Kubitscheck disagreed 
with the requirement to reduce subsidies on imports of 
wheat and petroleum. The IMF reforms were rejected and 
inflation continued to rise leading to political turmoil in 
the country. During this period of national uncertainty, 
there were significant fears of a left-wing uprising, leading 
to a military coup in 1964 by Humberto de Alencar 
Castelo Branco. Castelo’s government renegotiated loan 
agreements with the US and the IMF, and took aid from 
the Alliance for Progress program. Austerity measures to 
curb inflation and repay debt hurt Brazilians in the short 
term as reforms limited industrial expansion and allowed 
real wages amongst workers to drop (Wood 1982). These 
reforms began to pay off during the ‘Brazilian Miracle,’ but 
the new wealth gained was unevenly distributed. About 22 
million Brazilians were enjoying a high per capita income, 
while the other 85 million Brazilians lived at or below 
subsistence level (Green 2012). This legacy of uneven 
development has stuck with Brazil, as the country remains 
in the bottom quartile according to the World Bank’s GINI 
coefficient in 2017 (World Bank 2017). Kubitschek’s desire 
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to construct a capital city without adequate financing 
contributed to economic turmoil in Brazil. 
The astronomical cost to build Brasília was a product 
of Brazilian financial maladministration. The decision to 
build Brasília amplified Brazil’s economic crisis resulting 
in an even greater increase in inflation, the prompting 
of more mass migrations from the rural periphery, an 
amplification of ISI inefficiencies, and the acceleration of 
Rio de Janeiro’s decline. Kubitschek’s actions are not an 
isolated example in Brazil’s history. The military dictator-
ship that seized power in 1964 invested heavily in public 
works but relied heavily on deficit spending to finance the 
ambitious public works projects. This ultimately led to a 
major recession and hyperinflation in the 1980s at levels 
higher than 1964 levels. Major monetary mismanagement 
is still widespread in Brazilian politics; this occurred 
in Branco’s regime which developed large dams on the 
Amazon river and began the Trans-Amazonian Highway. 
Recurring bouts of extreme inflation led to modifications 
and sometimes the cessation of major projects (Cesar de 
Queiroz Ribeiro 2011). 
The cycle still continues; the latest example of this 
can be seen in the large public works projects of the 2014 
World Cup and the 2016 Olympics. In the development 
of these projects, there was extensive mismanagement 
and corruption, including fraud and embezzlement. 
49 days before the opening ceremony of the Olympics, 
Rio de Janeiro’s Governor Francisco Dornelles declared 
a state of financial emergency and asked the federal 
government for support to prevent a “total collapse in 
public security, health, education, transport and envi-
ronmental management” (Barbara 2016). The former 
Governor of the State of Rio de Janeiro Sérgio Cabral is 
serving a 200-year sentence for laundering tens of millions 
of dollars from public construction contracts, the former 
mayor Eduardo Paes of the City of Rio de Janeiro has been 
accused of taking money in exchange for contracts to build 
Olympic games facilities, and six of the twelve stadiums 
built for the World Cup are now under investigation for 
fraud (Chade 2017). This mismanagement has always 
resulted in significant changes, most notably the military 
dictatorship coming to power in 1964 and more recently 
extreme austerity measures for the State and city of Rio de 
Janeiro. In December 2016, the amendment PEC 55 was 
passed to freeze government social spending for a period 
of 20 years, allowing it to only rise and fall only in line with 
the country’s current inflation trends (Assis 2017). 
The current austerity measures that have taken place 
have eroded the Brazilian people’s faith in democratic 
government, effectively harming long term democratiza-
tion. This is seen in a poll by Latinobarometrico where 
Brazilians’ support for democracy fell by 22% in 2016, 
while 55% of Brazilians said they would not mind a return 
to rule under a military regime as long as it was effective 
and solved problems. (Corporación Latinobarómetro 
2016, P.25)
Brazil engages in significant public infrastructure 
projects and often sees consequences in the form of 
extreme debt. In 1952, Brazil developed what has become 
the second largest development bank in the world: The 
Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social 
(BNDES). This allows the country to pursue develop-
ment projects without abiding by the conditions set forth 
by other countries or agencies. However, this allows 
the government freer rein in spending toward projects 
which have little to no long-term economic development 
prospects for the region. This was seen in the develop-
ment of sporting complexes for the Olympics and World 
Cup, which are in a state of disrepair and only provided 
economic benefit for a short period of time during its 
construction and short-lived ability to attract tourists. The 
government needs to maintain a more selective criterion on 
what projects it pursues and be stricter with delinquency. 
Additionally, there has been alleged corruption in BNDES 
contracts, with funds going primarily to a few major 
contracting firms and cases of contracts being awarded 
before public bids are accepted (Goodman and Cuadros 
2013). The lack of diverse contracts was summarized in a 
statement by Brazilian writer Eliane Brum: “the companies 
built Brasília and have never left it.” There needs to be 
more oversight of the Brazilian development apparatus to 
allow for greater discretion in what projects are approved, 
stricter methods in the event of delinquency, and to 
guarantee that equitable and proper bidding procedures 
are followed when awarding contracts. This way, there will 
be less nepotism in the awarding of contracts and massive 
public works projects will have a higher degree of scrutiny 
and a more stringent approval process. When national or 
subnational authorities’ trend toward insolvency, they can 
do little in addressing prospective problems which may 
arise in their jurisdiction. 
Brasília Failed in its Goals to Build a Capital 
of Hope
Brasília did not succeed in its aims to build a classless 
egalitarian society. Rather, the demographics of Brasília 
are more reflective of the country, showcasing the extreme 
income inequality.  The plan in building Brasília was to 
establish an egalitarian city devoid of class division with 
no informal employment, no informal settlements, and 
to redistribute the ballooning wealth of the southeast to 
the interior of the country. At this time in Brazil’s history, 
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informal housing such as favelas and cortiços were 
becoming common and individuals were limited with little 
room for social mobility. Classicism defined the landscape 
of Brazilian cities, notably São Paulo where individuals 
of diverse classes lived in close proximity, but self-segre-
gation occurred with the emergence of private schools, 
private police, and gated communities, preventing social 
integration (Calderia 1996). Brasília’s chief architect Oscar 
Niemeyer attempted to combat this by designing the city 
so that all classes would live side by side in an attempt to 
overcome classist principles. Brasília came nowhere close 
to achieving its goal of an egalitarian society; the central 
housing that was planned to provide classless accommo-
dation is today almost exclusively occupied by the upper-
middle class. Most poor workers commute from one of 
the 27 satellite cities that emerged on Brasília’s periphery. 
According to the United Nations, it became one of the most 
unequal cities in the world today. In the UN report Bridging 
the Urban Divide, Brasília is one of the world’s top 10 most 
unequal cities with a Gini coefficient of 0.60 (Un-habitat 
2011, P.193). This rampant inequality emerged as the 
city was built and zoned for 500,000 residents (Bertaud 
2010, P.1), but the federal district currently houses about 
3 million individuals (IGBE 2016). Brasília was flooded by 
candangos who built settlements on the outskirts of the 
city because they could not afford to live in the centre. 
The satellite towns established by candangos suffer from 
significant underdevelopment; Arapoanga, for example, 
lacks many basic utilities such as paved roads and a sewage 
system just as a favela would in Rio de Janeiro. The satellite 
towns continue to expand at a rate that is difficult for 
Brasília’s government to maintain; from 2010 to 2016, their 
populations grew at an estimated rate of 20.56% (IGBE 
2010, IGBE 2016). Brasília was not immune to the social 
crises that plagued other Brazilian cities; the situation of 
1990s Brasília paralleled the situation of 1950s-1960s Rio 
de Janeiro. In August 1997, clashes between police and 
illegal occupants of public land left 20 injured and 49 
arrested (Lea et al. 2003). The city was designed to avoid 
the problems other Brazilian cities faced such as violence, 
corruption, overpopulation, and inequality, but ended 
up succumbing to these same problems. This is seen in 
the issue of income inequality, as Brazil’s wealthiest 1% 
of the population control the same amount of wealth 
as the bottom 50% of the population (about 80 million 
Brazilians) (Beghin 2008, p. 21). According to the United 
Nations Human Development Report, Brazil is the 3rd 
most unequal country in Latin America by Gini index, 
behind only Colombia and Honduras. It also ranks 10th 
in the world for global inequality (Un-habitat 2011). 
Brasília is reflective of this: it was ranked one of the 10 
most unequal cities in the world with a Gini coefficient 
of 0.60 (the only other Brazilian city making the list was 
Belo Horizonte with a Gini coefficient of 0.61) (Un-habitat 
2011). Despite the intention of eliminating class and tran-
scending Brazil’s chronic problems, Brasília now stands as 
the symbol of Brazil’s class inequality. 
Conclusion
The building of planned cities is not a new theme. Peter 
the Great built St. Petersburg as a window to the West 
towards Europe on the Baltic Sea. In 1800, Washington 
D.C. was developed under Major Pierre Charles L’Enfant’s 
plan, and in Australia, Canberra was developed in 
1913 following a long dispute over whether Sydney or 
Melbourne should be the national capital (Davison, Hirst, 
& Macintyre 1998). In an equally ambitious plan to St. 
Petersburg, Washington D.C., and Canberra, President 
Kubitschek attempted to fulfill the constitutional promise 
of 1891 and build Brasília in the Brazilian highlands. The 
city is similar in nature to Houston of the United States, 
where it is one of the fastest growing cities by wealth but 
lacking a true identity like New York or Chicago. The 
city showcases both the extreme wealth and poverty that 
is representative of Brazil. From this showcase, the city 
has earned the nickname by critics “ilha da fantasia,” or 
“fantasy island,” because of the dramatic contrast between 
the wealth in Brasília and the overwhelming poverty in the 
province of Goiás which surrounds the Federal District. 
The building of Brasília was too ambitious and shows the 
difficulties with large-scale central planning strategies 
attempting to achieve goals. The building of Brasília had 
notable consequences, such as leading to a more rapid 
decline of Rio de Janeiro and bringing forth a military 
dictatorship to Brazil. The cycles of heavy investment 
in large public infrastructure projects and the resulting 
economic booms and busts remain a theme throughout 
Brazil. The fallout from the development of Brasília may 
serve as a warning for other democratic governments to 
forgo the heavy and rapid development of a new capital. 
There have been new capital development projects since 
Brasília; however, they have all been from non-demo-
cratic countries whose actions are sheltered from domestic 
public backlash. These autocratic planned capitals include: 
Islamabad - Pakistan in 1966, Nur-Sultan - Kazakhstan in 
1997, and Naypyidaw - Myanmar in 2006.
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